Recent success for Nick Mason-Williams in the Upper Tribunal

by Admin | Property Law

Nick Mason-Williams recently appeared in the Upper Tribunal, successfully preserving his client’s ability to prevent residential development on land that had been sold subject to clear restrictions on construction and development.

The applicant had purchased a number of garages in 2023 and subsequently sought to build a bungalow on the site, applying to the Tribunal to modify the covenants to permit the development.

Following Nick’s successful submissions, the application was refused, with the Tribunal finding that the covenants continued to provide practical benefits of substantial advantage to his client.

Read the decision here.

Read Nick’s practice profile here.

Forced entry in access injunctions – can a tenancy agreement provide for forced entry?

by Admin | Property Law

Written by Michael Williams

There are conflicting views on whether a court has the power to grant a forced entry provision as part of an access injunction, or to enforce an access injunction by permitting forced entry. Typically, housing providers apply for these injunctions when a tenant is denying access or ignoring requests for access to the premises in circumstances where the landlord wishes to conduct gas or electrical safety checks and repairs. This article explores the further question of whether a contractual clause permitting forced entry in emergencies, or in other narrowly defined circumstances, helps resolve the impasse.

In Sovereign Housing Association Ltd v Hall (unreported, Bristol County Court, 10 July 2024), the claimant landlord obtained an access injunction against the defendant tenant. The defendant did not comply with the order. The claimant applied for the order to be enforced through an order permitting the claimant to force entry. The District Judge who heard the application decided that the court did not have jurisdiction to make such an order. On appeal, his Honour Judge Berkley held that the court did have the power to do so under CPR 70.2A. This rule provides that: “…if a mandatory order, an injunction or a judgment or order for the specific performance of a contract is not complied with, the court may direct that the act required to be done may, so far as practicable, be done by another person…”.

In Southern Housing v James Emmanuel [2025] EWCC 58, District Judge Cridge was faced with a similar set of facts. Conscious of the inconsistent approach taken by County Court judges, he undertook a detailed analysis of the relevant law and concluded that the court did not have the power to allow forced entry. District Judge Cridge confirmed that no judge has the power to allow someone to forcefully enter another’s home, unless there is express law that bestows that power. The Gas Safety (Installation and Use) Regulations 1998 regulations (often relied on in access injunctions), did not confer a power of forced entry.

Judge Cridge addressed the argument based on CPR 70.2A. He held that under the original injunction, the defendant’s act was allowing the claimant in. This was not capable of being performed by another person. By asking the court to permit forced entry, the claimant was not asking for the act under the original order to be performed by another, but rather a different act altogether. Judge Cridge also took the view that the Civil Procedure Rules governed procedure and could not be employed in a way which altered substantive rights and powers.

In Taylor Clark Ltd v Mohamed (unreported, Central London County Court, 5 March 2026), the court was persuaded to depart from District Judge Cridge’s reasoning as it pertained to CPR 70.2A. The decision is unreported but the barrister acting for the claimant in that case has kindly made his submissions available online. District Judge Le Bas accepted that an access injunction did not direct a defendant to “permit” or “allow” access, but rather to facilitate access, by opening the door, in accordance with their contractually binding consent to the landlord having access in certain situations. If the tenant did not give access voluntarily, the court could grant permission for the door to be opened by another. This did not alter the substantive law, but gave effect to it.

There is no indication that the relevant access clauses in these cases included a right to force entry in emergencies or other defined circumstances. For such a clause to move the dial in an application to allow forced entry, it seems that the claimant would need to persuade the court of two things. First, that the situation is an emergency or that the defined situation has arisen. Second, that the clause constitutes a pre-emptive consent to forced entry and that the court’s power to make such an order flows from that consent.

The first question will likely depend on the specific facts of the case. A long overdue gas inspection or rickety gas installation may well constitute an emergency, given the risks involved.

The second question turns on whether a contractual clause allowing for forced entry in an emergency or other defined situation constitutes sufficient consent to constitute a defence to the tort of trespass. If the answer to this is yes, it may also be necessary for the court to decide whether that consent was subsequently revoked.

The courts seem to have no trouble enforcing access clauses through injunctions, where consent to access in certain situations is given in advance. This is so even where the tenant might have revoked their consent, either expressly or by ignoring attempts at access. The controversy only arises when the court is asked to create an enforcement mechanism for an injunction based on an access clause. However, where a contractual clause permits forced entry in an emergency or other narrowly defined situation, there appears to be no clear reason why that should not found an injunction in the same way that an access clause does. This is of course provided that the claimant can persuade the court that the defined situation or emergency has arisen.

It may be argued that section 6 of the Criminal Law Act 1977 creates the offence of violence for securing entry, and that parties cannot contract out of the consequences of this criminal sanction. However, it is a prerequisite of that section that the person seeking to secure entry has “no lawful authority” to do so. The section also requires opposition to entry from someone present at the premises, which opposition is known by the person looking to enter. Express, contractual consent would likely constitute lawful authority.

As District Judge Cridge observed, the issue of the courts’ powers to grant forced entry provisions is one which is crying out for guidance from more senior courts. I would add to the to-do list of those courts the question of whether a clause which pre-emptively consents to forced entry (in narrowly defined circumstances) materially affects the position. Any higher court’s decision will need to carefully balance privacy rights with the safety risks that arise when a landlord cannot gain access to a property conduct gas and other inspections and repairs.